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 Presents results two studies into the influence of primacy and recency effects in interaction. 
 Shows that recency effects significantly influence preferences. 
 Primacy effects were not shown to influence preferences.  
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Interactive computing tasks are composed of sequences of sub-interactions (or 
“moments”), each of which yields a slightly different user experience. Prior work, 
predominantly from the psychology literature, suggests that the order of these moments 
can affect people‟s retrospective evaluation of experiences. Several kinds of sequencing 
effects have been examined, including primacy, recency, and peak-end effects. We 
review previous research on sequencing effects and their potential application in Human-
Computer Interaction, of which prior work has found mixed results regarding the 
influence of interaction sequence on preference – possibly because the magnitude of 
experiential changes caused by interactive tasks are weaker than those studied in 
psychological experiments. However, sequencing effects are still of great importance to 
interface design, because when they occur, they have the potential to substantially change 
user preferences for common interactions. To explore the subtlety of sequencing effects 
in HCI, we describe two experiments that examined user preferences for series of 
interactions with different orderings that created positive and negative recency and 
primacy effects. Positive and negative experiences were created with simulated system 
assistance that either worked well (aiding the user in drag-and-drop tasks) or worked 
poorly (hindering the user). In both experiments, the series differed only in the order of 
positive and negative momentary experiences. Results of Experiment 1 were mixed: the 
study provided some support for recency effects, but without strong evidence. 
Experiment 2 modified the experimental method to better accentuate the positive and 
negative experiences, and produced results showing strong effects of recency, but not of 
primacy. We discuss reasons for these results, consider overall explanations for the subtle 
nature of sequencing effects on HCI tasks, and provide an agenda for further research and 
design lessons regarding recency effects. Overall, we contribute new understanding of a 
phenomenon that can have a substantial impact on user experience, but that is currently 
underexplored in HCI. 
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1 Introduction  
Subjective experience is a major factor in the success of an interactive system – a 
person‟s willingness to use (or re-use) an application is strongly influenced by the 
perceived enjoyment of doing so (Carroll, 1987; Davis et al., 1992; Hassenzahl et al., 
2000; Malone, 1980; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Understanding the factors that influence 
user assessment of subjective experience is therefore a key objective for research in 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). 
Studies of subjective user experience in HCI have focused on several different aspects 
of interaction, including: methods for measuring user satisfaction (Chin et al., 1988; 
Hornbaek, 2006), the role of interaction aesthetics (Hassenzahl, 2004; Porat and 
Tractinsky, 2012; Tractinsky et al., 2000; Udsen and Jørgensen, 2005), improving 
engagement through gamification (Deterding et al., 2011), and interaction features that 
delight users (Levesque et al., 2011; Shneiderman, 1987; Zhang and von Dran, 2001). 
Others have developed models of users‟ acceptance of technology, such as the 
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
An important feature in studies of subjective experience is the difference between the 
user‟s instantaneous experience (as the interaction is happening), and their recollected 
experience (after the interaction is complete). Although both are important, recollected 
experience is more of a concern for designers, because the user‟s memory of their 
experience will influence their willingness to repeat an interaction. For example, user 
retention at an e-commerce website is likely to be strongly influenced by users‟ 
recollection of their shopping and checkout experiences at the site. 
One factor in user experience studies that has not been examined closely is the way 
that changes to the sequencing of sub-interactions (called “moments”) can influence 
people‟s memory of an interactive experience. Psychological research has found that a 
person‟s recollection of an experience is not always faithful to what actually happened. In 
particular, three factors – primacy, recency, and peak-end effects – are known to 
influence people‟s memory of experiences. Primacy effects refer to an enhanced memory 
and an over-weighted influence of the initial moments of an experience (Murdock Jr, 
1962; Shteingart et al., 2013; Zauberman et al., 2006), while recency and peak-end 
effects refer to an over-weighted influence of the terminating (end) and most intense 
(peak) moments (Kahneman et al., 1993). These effects have been demonstrated to 
influence hedonic assessment (i.e. assessment of pain or pleasure) in several settings, 
including memory of pain during medical procedures (Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996), 
the retrospective assessment of payment sequences (Langer et al., 2005; Nasiry and 
Popescu, 2011), the remembered enjoyment of holidays (Kemp et al., 2008), and 
assessments of quality of life (Diener et al., 2001) or material goods (Do et al., 2008). 
Further consequences of these effects are that the duration of an experience has relatively 
little effect on the remembered experience (duration neglect), and that adding positive 
experiences (or, less-negative experiences) to the end of a generally negative event can 
















people‟s memories are generally insensitive to the duration of an event, but are instead 
concentrated on the sensations felt near its end. 
Despite the wide range of psychological studies that show a robust influence of 
sequencing effects, HCI has seen few experiments examining their influence on user 
experience. In addition, attempts to directly test the existence of peak-end effects in 
interactive settings have produced equivocal results, with hypothesised preferences 
observed in only one of three conditions involving form-filling interfaces (Cockburn et 
al., 2015) and only one of eight tested conditions with computer games (Gutwin et al., 
2016).  
The previous work in HCI provides only limited evidence that sequencing effects 
influence user preferences in interaction. However, if validated and understood in 
interactive contexts, sequencing effects could have important implications for interface 
design: for example, they might reveal opportunities for designers to influence a user‟s 
memory of an interactive experience simply by altering the sequence of elements within 
an interaction, potentially leading to a more favourable view of the system. As stated 
above, it is a user‟s retrospective assessment of experience that is crucial for design, 
because their willingness to repeat an interaction will be influenced by their memory of 
it.  
In this paper we examine whether sequencing effects influence user preferences for 
interactions with computer systems. We first review prior literature examining related 
effects across various disciplines, including HCI, and then describe two empirical studies 
in which participants were asked to choose which of two sequences they would prefer to 
repeat, where the sequences manipulated only the ordering of otherwise identical tasks. 
The individual tasks involved drag-and-drop manipulations of objects – with positive, 
neutral, and negative momentary sensations induced through positive, control, and 
negative snap-to-grid assistance while aligning the dragged object with the target. During 
positive tasks, the dragged object and target were aligned with a coarse grid that made 
task completion easier and faster; during control tasks, the dragged object moved under 
direct-manipulation (i.e. without snapping); and in negative tasks, the dragged object 
snapped to a grid, but with the target purposely misaligned with the grid – requiring 
participants to drop the dragged object and reacquire it with the „control‟ key pressed, 
which reverted to direct-manipulation (control) dragging.  
The first experiment (n=46) compared sequences with a positive start to sequences 
with a positive end, and sequences with a negative start to sequences with a negative end 
(in both cases, comparing recency vs. primacy effects). Although participant preferences 
overall were in line with the recency hypothesis (i.e. that people are influenced more by 
moments at the end of a sequence), only one significant difference was found on any 
measure (frustration/satisfaction ratings were significantly worse for a “negative end” 
compared to a “negative start”).  
The second experiment (n=73) modified the experimental method in order to 
accentuate the magnitude of momentary sensations, and added new conditions in order to 
















recency on preferences for both positive and negative endings – that is, participant 
preferences were influenced more strongly by the final moments of the sequence. No 
effects of primacy were observed – that is, positive or negative moments at the start of 
the sequence did not reliably influence preferences.  
In the discussion, we examine the results from these and related studies to identify 
interaction conditions and stimuli likely to influence user experience through sequencing 
effects, and we identify implications for UX designers and HCI researchers. The 
existence of sequencing effects, even for simple repetitive tasks in user interfaces, shows 
that designers must think carefully about the ordering of experience in addition to more 
traditional aspects of design such as usability, utility, and aesthetics.  
Overall, this research provides new evidence that sequencing effects can have a 
significant impact on user experience and user preferences, even in common interactive 
tasks. We also contribute to a new understanding of how, where, and why these effects 
can influence preference, including a discussion of the types of interactive stimuli that are 
likely to induce reliable effects, as well as establishing an agenda for further research. 
Our studies suggest that consideration of sequencing effects can provide new 
opportunities for improving user experience in interactive systems, as well as warnings to 
designers and researchers who study UX and usability. 
2 Related Work 
When people evaluate or assess experiences (such as surgical procedures, periods of their 
lives, or interaction tasks), they rely on their memory of what happened and how they felt 
during the experience. Although people often believe that their memories faithfully 
represent experience, psychological research has identified systematic differences 
between what is objectively experienced during an episode, and the later recollection of 
those experiences. For example, memories of pain are strongly influenced by the severity 
and the recency of the discomfort, rather than the total amount or duration (Kahneman, 
2000a; Kahneman, 2000b). These systematic biases between objective and remembered 
experience can influence people‟s judgement about the experience – for example, 
whether they would voluntarily repeat it, or would prefer it to some alternative 
experience.  
In this section we review prior work from psychology that models how we experience 
and remember our experience of events and episodes, and focus in particular on theories 
of recency, peak-end, duration neglect, and primacy. We also review HCI research that 
seeks to improve our understanding of hedonic and affective experience in interactive 
contexts, with an emphasis on prior studies of sequencing effects in interaction. 
2.1 Experience by Moments 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) presented a model of experience that discretises an 
event into a series of moments (further developed in Kahneman, 2000a; Kahneman, 
2000b). They argued that people experience events (such psychological experiments, 
















discrete moments, rather than as a continuous stream. The construction of these moments, 
and biases in one‟s memories of them, introduces discrepancies between the recollection 
of an experience and what was actually experienced.  
The idea of momentary memory implies that we do not store our experiences in perfect 
experiential and temporal fidelity – rather, memories are formed from snapshots of the 
representative moments in an experience, with a bias towards the most significant or 
interesting episodes. Researchers who analyse these moments consider three types of 
utility (i.e. subjective worth as considered by economists; Kahneman et al., 1997):  
 Instant utility. The subjective experience of a moment at the instant that it is 
experienced: a “measure of hedonic and affective experience, which can be 
derived from immediate reports of current subjective experience” (Kahneman 
et al., 1997, p. 376).  
 Total utility. A temporal integral of the instant utilities for the moments that 
constitute an event: an objective measure of the total amount of pleasure or 
pain that was actually experienced. 
 Remembered utility. A retrospective account of the total utility measure: what 
a person remembers and is able to recall about their experience of an event. 
Total utility is considered an objective measure: it is an account of the total pleasure 
and pain experienced by a person during an event from real-time measures as it is 
experienced. Kahneman et al. (1997) describe two rules that govern total utility: 
1. Separability. The order in which moments are experienced does not affect total 
utility. 
2. Time neutrality. All moments are weighted equally, and total utility does not 
diminish over time. That is, any time gap between the experience and an 
assessment of that experience does not change total utility. 
However, experimental research has found that these two rules do not hold for 
remembered utility (i.e. the retrospective account of total utility; Varey and Kahneman, 
1992). Instead, remembered utility is vulnerable to psychological biases and frailties of 
memory, three of which we focus on here: 
1. Peak-end. The most intense (i.e. most pleasurable or most painful) and 
terminating moments of an event have a disproportionally high influence on its 
remembered utility. 

















3. Violations of temporal dominance. The remembered utility of a negative event 
can be increased by extending it with moments that reduce the average pain, even 
if they increase the overall (summed) pain. 
2.2 Recency and Peak-End Effects 
The peak-end rule states that people‟s memory of an experience is influenced by its peak 
moment (either positive or negative) and its final moments. The rule therefore 
encompasses the influence of two different types of momentary experience (peak 
intensity and terminating experience), although experiments into the effect often address 
only one of the two.  
In a now-famous experiment investigating the influence of the terminating moments of 
experience, Kahneman et al. (1993) conducted a „cold-pressor‟ experiment, which had 
participants submerge their hands in water under two conditions: short and long. Both 
began with the participant‟s hand in unpleasantly cold water (14°C) for one minute. In 
the short condition, participants then removed their hand from the water; but in the long 
condition, they kept their hand submerged for an additional 30 seconds while the water 
was surreptitiously warmed to a slightly-less-unpleasant 15°C. When participants were 
asked which trial they would prefer to repeat, most chose the long condition: that is, they 
preferred a longer unpleasant experience that had a slightly less unpleasant ending, 
effectively choosing an experience with more pain over one with less. 
Participants were also asked to report a real-time measure of their discomfort (their 
instant utility) using a potentiometer. The discomfort of the first minute was comparable 
between conditions, but the final 30 seconds of the long trial had a significant drop in 
discomfort for most participants (the main finding was robust when replicated without 
this measure). That is, participants were able to recognise the drop in discomfort at the 
end of the long condition, and despite also correctly identifying that the trial lasted 
longer, they felt it had less overall discomfort (their remembered utility). This apparent 
conflict was attributed to the peak-end effect: reports of subjective experience were 
dominated by the most intense moment and the terminating moment. 
The peak-end rule was also observed in retrospective reports from patients of a 
colonoscopy procedure (Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003), 
whose experience was dominated by their peak discomfort and by their discomfort at the 
end of the procedure – and was unrelated to the procedure‟s duration (which varied 
between 4 and 69 minutes). Ariely (1998) also observed the rule in two experiments that 
applied pain to participants using a heating element or vice: they found a peak-end effect 
in global retrospective evaluations of the experience, and mixed results for the influence 
of the experience‟s duration.  
Judgements about pleasurable experiences are also subject to the peak-end rule. For 
example, Do et al. (2008) examined the perceived pleasure in receiving gifts. In their first 
experiment, two lists of DVDs were produced („A‟ and „B‟) and given to participants as 
part of a raffle. The „A‟ list was populated with high-rated movies; the „B‟ list with low-
















(b) an „A‟ movie and a „B‟ movie later, (c) a „B‟ movie and an „A‟ movie later, or (d) one 
„B‟ movie. Receiving a „B‟ movie alone was rated positively, but receiving an „A‟ movie 
followed by a „B‟ movie was rated worse than receiving an „A‟ movie alone. These 
findings were further supported in a second experiment that gave sweets to children on 
Halloween. They concluded their paper with advice for gift giving: “you might consider 
giving only the best one – or at least making sure that you give the best one last” (p. 98). 
2.2.1 Duration Neglect and Violations of Temporal Dominance 
Recollections of experience are also subject to temporal biases – such as duration neglect 
and violations of temporal dominance – in which people‟s memory of time does not 
accurately reflect the actual duration of events. These effects are closely related to the 
peak-end rule – for example, results of both the cold-pressor and colonoscopy studies 
found that participants ignored the duration of the events in their attention to the peak and 
end moments. However, duration neglect and violations of temporal dominance involve 
different effects on memory. 
The assumption of temporal dominance suggests that adding negative moments to an 
experience should make the overall experience more negative. However, studies have 
consistently found that this assumption is incorrect. For example, Fredrickson and 
Kahneman (1993) exposed participants to films containing either pleasant or aversive 
imagery, and recorded both their real-time and retrospective global affect ratings. They 
found that the duration of the films had only a small effect on the retrospective 
evaluation, and that evaluations appeared to be based on a weighted average of the 
moments in the experience – that is, adding less-negative imagery to a substantially 
negative experience improved the reported evaluation of the overall experience.  
Schreiber and Kahneman (2000) conducted a similar series of experiments using 
unpleasant sounds of varied loudness and duration. Although they found peak-end 
responses to the stimuli, they did not find duration neglect: the duration of the experience 
had an additive effect on remembered utility. However, they did observe violations of 
temporal dominance: extending an aversive sound with a less aversive one improved the 
remembered utility of the total experience. 
Related effects have been observed in many other fields, including in article pricing 
(Nasiry and Popescu, 2011) and effortful study (Finn, 2010). However, the effects are 
sometimes subtle: for example, experiments involving simulated payment sequences 
(Langer et al., 2005) found that peak-end effects were not observed when participants 
were focused on the experimental manipulation, but that they became significant when 
participants were concurrently engaged in a distractor task. Experiments on gastronomic 
experiences validated duration neglect and demonstrated preference for increasing 
pleasantness across the courses of a meal, but failed to validate reliable effects of peak or 
















2.2.2 Primacy Effects 
In contrast with peak-end and recency effects, primacy effects cause stronger memories 
for experiences that are encountered first. Many experiments have confirmed that in free 
recall tasks, the probability of recalling an item follows a roughly U-shaped curve across 
the serial position of cued items (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Murdock Jr, 1962; Page and 
Norris, 1998): initial items are recalled more reliably than those in the middle of the set, 
and terminating items are recalled most reliably. Primacy effects are also reflected in 
experiments on anchoring effects, which have shown that initial data items or experiences 
have a strong influence on the outcome of decisions, judgments and computations. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that participants‟ rapid estimation of the 
product of the integers 1 through 8 was significantly lower (a median answer of 512) than 
that for the reversed order 8 to 1 (a median answer of 2250). Similarly, a study by 
Zauberman et al. (2006) examined participants‟ ratings of job applicants after watching a 
dynamic graphical pattern representing the applicant‟s correct and incorrect responses to 
30 test questions. The patterns were manipulated to show increasing or decreasing rates 
of correct responses. Their findings showed strong primacy effects for informational 
assessments (i.e. reporting the count of questions answered correctly) rather than 
affective ones (i.e. overall satisfaction with the candidate); in contrast, recency effects 
showed the reverse (strongest for affective, less strong for informational).  
Whereas the underlying causes of recency effects are generally attributed to the 
volatile limitations of short-term memory – as new data or experiences arise, they 
overwrite previously stored information (Craik and Lockhart, 1972) – the memory 
systems underlying primacy are not well understood. Opinions differ on whether initial 
items are recalled better because they offer increased opportunities for rehearsal (Rundus, 
1971), because they lack interference with other items (Crowder, 1982), or because of the 
contributions of other memory systems (Davelaar et al., 2005; Henson, 1998). 
Regardless of the mechanisms underlying primacy and recency effects, they are 
robustly observable in various forms of memory tests (Montgomery and Unnava, 2009; 
Weiss et al., 2014). 
2.3 Expectation Theory 
The effects described above (regarding primacy, recency, and peak-end) involve human 
memory systems, and this is the theoretical framework that we use in this paper. An 
alternative theory, however, has also been proposed to explain sequencing effects – using 
the idea that manipulating user expectations can influence people‟s assessment of 
experiences.  
For example, a recently study by Michalco et al. (2015) examined assessments of 
video games. Expectations about video game quality were set through positive or 
negative reviews; participants then played the games and rated them. The study found 
that participants who felt a game failed to meet expectations rated the game negatively 
(on several affective measures), while those who felt it exceeded expectations gave 
















disconfirmation (Oliver, 1977) – a framework for contemplating the relationship between 
expectations and outcomes that was prevalent in marketing research in the 1970s and 80s. 
Expectation disconfirmation does not predict any empirical outcomes; rather, various 
adaptation theories (including contrast theory (Sherif, 1961), assimilation theory (Sherif, 
1961), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957)) explain how disconfirmation is 
resolved into subjective preferences. For example, under contrast theory the surprise of a 
disconfirmation causes perceptions to be exaggerated (an outcome that is positively 
disconfirmed is perceived as more positive than is objectively the case, and vice versa), 
while under assimilation theory disconfirmation is psychologically uncomfortable and is 
resolved by distorting the perception of performance to bring it closer to what was 
expected. 
Expectation theory can appear to provide a useful framework for explaining 
sequencing effects as well. However, the proposed theories are incompatible with one 
another, and their application has been criticised (Yi, 1990).  Even if studies of 
sequencing effects can be interpreted within the framework of expectation 
disconfirmation, the framework remains non-predictive (or rather, it predicts every 
outcome). For example, in Kahneman et al.‟s cold-pressor experiment, participants might 
have set their expectation for the terminating moments of experience during the first 
minute. The lessening of pain during the extended condition might have exceeded 
expectations leading to positive ratings (under contrast theory), or the experience may 
have been adapted to match expectations leading to neutral or negative ratings (under 
assimilation theory). 
In Michalco et al.‟s study, the difficulty with expectation theory becomes clear, 
because in interpreting their findings, Michalco et al. accept two opposing adaptation 
theories to explain their pattern of results: “when expectations were disconfirmed, 
contrast theory appears to apply ... and when expectations were confirmed, assimilation 
theory seems to apply” (p. 615). As a result of these theoretical incompatibilities and the 
lack of predictive power, we do not consider expectation theory further, and interpret our 
empirical results using the memory-based theories of sequence effect described above. 
2.4 Sequencing Effects in Interaction  
Although much of the research into sequencing has taken place outside of HCI, there are 
a few studies that consider these effects with a variety of interactive sequences. 
Hassenzahl and Sandweg (2004) examined correlations between perceived usability of an 
interactive system and various measures characterising mental effort during an interactive 
task. Measures of mental effort included intensity of the whole series, variations in 
intensity, end intensity, peak intensity divided by end intensity, and trend (reducing or 
increasing mental intensity). Results found that of these measures, end intensity was best 
correlated with summary measures of perceived usability (r = -.49). They described this 
as a recency effect, stating: “Individuals construct their summary assessment on the basis 
of what comes to their mind about the episode they just experienced. The more recent a 
















in several ways, including analysis of preferences between interface series and use of 
tasks that are not immediately tied to mental effort. 
In a study of progress bar behaviours, Harrison et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
experimental participants‟ rated progress bars of objectively-equal duration as being 
faster when their rate of progress accelerated across time. Harrison et al. attributed this 
finding to peak-end effects. A later study (Harrison et al., 2010) examined animation 
effects within progress bars, finding generally similar results (i.e. accelerating animations 
were generally perceived as faster than others) – although the animation that was 
perceived as fastest used a decelerating backwards pulse.  
Cockburn et al. (2015) directly examined user preferences derived from peak-end 
effects. Their conditions varied the distribution of otherwise identical components of 
mundane physical workload in interactive tasks, with participants making a preference 
choice between two interactive series. Both series presented five screens containing a 
number of sliders that had to be set to exact numerical values; there were always a total 
of 25 sliders, but the number of sliders on each page was manipulated to create peak, end, 
and peak-and-end experiences. Pages with few sliders were hypothesised to induce 
momentarily more positive experiences (as they involved less effort) than pages with 
many sliders – for example, the „positive peak-and-end‟ condition used only 2 and 3 
sliders on the second and last pages, while the „negative peak-and-end‟ condition used 8 
and 6 slides on the last two pages. Participants‟ preference choices conformed to the 
peak-end rule in a condition that combined peak and end effects, but the conditions that 
separately manipulated end and peak effects did not show significant effects on 
preference.  
Gutwin et al. (2016) examined the application of the peak-end rule in user experience 
with interactive computer games. A first experiment manipulated the difficulty in two 
different games to induce positive, neutral and negative peak-end effects. Of the six 
tested preference effects, only one (positive vs. negative in a Bejeweled-style game) 
supported the hypothesised peak-end effect. A second experiment then manipulated the 
sequence of skill-challenge balance by first assessing a participant‟s ability and then 
generating game sequences that altered the challenge to produce sequences that varied 
between appropriate challenge, too easy, and too hard. Significant effects on the 
participants‟ perception of challenge were observed, but there were no effects on 
preference.  
To our knowledge, primacy effects have received little attention in HCI. In a study of 
user preferences for computer-synthesised voices, Lee et al. (2011) explicitly refer to 
primacy as an explanation for their participants‟ general preference for the first voice 
heard. Similarly, Harrison‟s (2007) progress bar study (described above) observed a 
significant preference for the first observed behaviour, despite a counter-balanced design 
















3 Evaluating Sequencing Effects in Interaction 
The prior results on recency, primacy, and peak-end effects in interaction provide 
evidence that sequencing can influence user preferences – however, the interaction 
studies described above are much more equivocal than earlier experiments in psychology. 
One factor contributing to the difference in effect between these two domains could be 
the very different stimuli evaluated in each domain. All of the stimuli examined in studies 
of interactive sequences are arguably less visceral than the stimuli typically examined in 
psychology experiments: for example, HCI studies have looked at mental workload 
(Hassenzahl and Sandweg, 2004), perception of progress bars (Harrison et al., 2007; 
2010), physical workload (Cockburn et al., 2015), and game difficulty (Gutwin et al., 
2016); in contrast, psychological studies have used physical stimuli such as the pain of 
cold water immersion or surgical procedures, or the pleasure of receiving gifts. 
Interactive experiences are not usually „pleasurable‟ or „painful‟ in the same respect 
as the stimuli used in these psychological studies. Rather, momentary subjective 
experiences are derived from qualities of the interaction, such as the frustration or 
satisfaction associated with task completion through the interface. These experiences may 
lead to greater variance in the effects of sequencing – but it is important to note that this 
variability does not reduce the importance of studying sequencing as an HCI 
phenomenon. Prior studies have shown that when a sequencing effect occurs, it can have 
a substantial influence on preference – the variability, therefore, arises primarily in terms 
of when and where sequencing has effects, rather than the impact of those effects. This 
situation makes it particularly difficult for designers to know what to do – sequencing 
effects can have important effects on user retention and user experience, but it is not clear 
exactly when and where the effects will occur, and not clear how other factors in the 
interactive setting may interact with sequencing. 
Given the small number of studies in interactive contexts, it is important to further 
explore the applicability and strength of sequencing effects. In the studies described 
below we report on one such further exploration that examines these issues for a simple 
interactive task. To begin, we consider two issues that are critical to the design of 
experiments that test sequence effects in interaction: (1) determination of an interactive 
stimulus that can reliably induce momentary positive and negative sensations in users; 
and (2) determination of a method for observing and measuring sequence effects. 
3.1 Stimulus for Momentary Experience 
To provide a reliable interactive stimulus for positive and negative momentary 
sensations, we selected assistive user interfaces, which can be either successful or 
unsuccessful in helping the user. Assistive interfaces involve „smart‟ interactive features 
that attempt to infer a user‟s intention and reformulate their input to match that inference. 
Examples include text entry auto-correct on mobile phones, auto-formatting in word 
processors (e.g. inferring that a bullet or enumerated list is intended), and various forms 
of „snap-to‟ object manipulation (e.g. snap-to-grid). When the interface correctly infers 
















momentary sensation of satisfaction due to the interface‟s task assistance. However, 
when the interface incorrectly infers the user‟s intention (e.g. replacing a correctly typed 
word with an incorrect one), the user is likely to experience a negative sensation due to 
the need to correct the system‟s mistake.  
The two experiments described below explore snap-to-grid assistance during drag-
and-drop interactions. In our simulated assistance system, successful snap-to-grid (where 
the target aligns with the grid) assisted task completion, and unsuccessful snap-to-grid 
(where the target is misaligned with the grid) hindered task completion – requiring the 
user to drop the dragged object and reacquire it with a modifier key that overrides the 
assistance. We chose this snap-to-grid mechanism for four main reasons: 
1. Snap-to-grid is a widely used and easily understood interaction; this 
familiarity provides participants with a clear impression of the quality of 
assistance from the interface.  
2. It is easy to precisely control the magnitude of the assistance or hindrance by 
altering the grid resolution.  
3. Snap-to-grid eliminates many uncontrolled variables that occur in other 
assistive domains. For example, if text-entry autocorrect were used, it would 
be difficult to control the timing and presence of user errors, potentially 
requiring artificial constraints on error-free performance that may influence 
the results (Quinn and Zhai, 2016).  
4. A recent analysis of snap-to-grid behaviours showed that this manipulation 
can provide a reliable and sensitive method for analysing user preferences 
(Quinn and Cockburn, 2016).  
3.2 Measurement of Sequencing Effects 
In addition to determining a stimulus for creating momentary positive and negative 
subjective experiences, a method is also required for measuring the influence of 
sequencing effects. Prior psychological studies have asked simple and broad questions in 
order to measure participants‟ subjective experience – e.g. “how much discomfort did 
you experience?” on a five-point Likert scale (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993). In 
contrast, HCI studies of subjective experience have often targeted more specific qualities 
of subjective experience: for example, pragmatic vs. hedonic quality (Hassenzahl et al., 
2015); or perceived competence, autonomy, relatedness, and enjoyment from self-
determination theory (Ryan et al., 2006). This added specificity could be valuable in 
studying user experience with sequence effects – however, an issue with measuring the 
magnitude of a subjective experience is ensuring reliability of the measure (that is, 
ensuring all participants interpret the question in the same way, and that their response to 
the measurement scale is comparable). This issue is particularly problematic when the 
manipulations are subtle and may not influence all participants equally – for example, 
















by an objective 1˚C, the gains provided by an assistive pointing technique will vary with 
each user‟s pointing ability. 
These difficulties with scalar measurements lead us to forced preference choices 
between two alternatives. This is also a common method used in psychology for 
measuring subjective experience – e.g. “for today‟s third trial, you can pick which of the 
previous cold-water trials you will repeat” (Kahneman et al., 1993). A forced-choice 
preference measure is valuable because it is not open to interpretation about any 
particular qualities of the experience – it is a truly holistic measure. While it does not 
give an indication about the magnitude of the preference, it can be tested repeatedly with 
different pairs of interfaces to explore different aspects of the experience. In addition, 
choosing which sequence the participant would prefer to repeat matches the overall 
design problem of creating user experiences that maximize user retention and likelihood 
of re-use. These advantages of forced preference choice lead us to use it as the primary 
dependent measure in both of the studies described in the next two sections. 
4 Experiment 1 
The goal of the first experiment was to determine whether user preferences for interactive 
experiences are more influenced by recency or primacy effects. The experiment used the 
simple and common interactive task of drag-and-drop: selecting an object with a mouse 
cursor, dragging it to a target location, aligning it precisely with the target, and dropping 
it. Participants completed sequences made up of several individual drag-and-drop tasks, 
and for each pair of sequences, they were then asked which series they would choose to 
repeat (i.e. a forced-preference choice). The collection of individual tasks in each series 
within a pair was identical, but the order of presentation was manipulated to create a 
different ordering of positive and negative momentary experiences.   
There were three types of individual tasks that could be combined to form a sequence, 
each designed to create a different type of momentary experience: 
1. Control dragging (neutral momentary experience). When dragged with the mouse 
cursor, the object moved on a fine-grained grid (4×4 px), which approximated the 
continuous dragging used in many traditional drag-and-drop settings. The 4×4 px 
grid was used to simplify the final drop action, so that participants did not need to 
position the object perfectly on the target before dropping. The fine-grained grid 
did not detract from the smoothness of object movement, however, and was not 
obvious to participants. 
2. Positive snapping (positive momentary experience). The object moved on an 
84×84 px grid while it was being dragged, and the target was aligned with the 
grid (see Figure 1). Positive snapping assisted participants in completing their 
drag-and-drop task (compared to Control) by reducing the pointing accuracy 
required to bring the object into alignment with the target; 
3. Negative snapping (negative momentary experience). The object moved on a 
















After dropping the object as near as they could move it towards the target, 
participants had to reselect it while holding down the „control‟ key, which 
temporarily switched the interface back to Control dragging (see Figure 2). 
Negative snapping hindered the user in completing the drag-and-drop task by 
introducing this extra step to each task.  
 
Figure 1. Positive snapping: the dragged object snaps to the grid, and the target is aligned with the grid.  
 
Figure 2. Negative snapping: the target box is misaligned with the snapping grid. To complete the drag-and-
drop task (not shown here), the user must drop the object and reacquire it with the ‘control’ key pressed, at 
which point the object can be moved with a fine granularity (on a 4×4 px grid).  
 
Control dragging served as a baseline behaviour, with the intention that Positive and 
Negative snapping trials would induce momentary positive and negative sensations 
relative to it.  
The experiment asked participants to complete four pairs of drag-and-drop sequences, 
and make preference choices for one sequence in each pair. First, participants completed 
the two Manipulation Check (MC) conditions mentioned above: 
1. MC1.1 Positive snapping is preferred to Control dragging. This condition is 
included to validate the assumption that participants prefer Positive snapping 
tasks to Control dragging tasks.  
2. MC1.2 Control dragging is preferred to Negative snapping. This condition is 
included to validate the assumption that participants prefer Control dragging 
















These were followed by two conditions that tested whether recency is stronger than 
primacy: 
3. H1.3 A positive end is preferred to a positive start. The two series are 
identical, except for the location of four Positive snapping tasks. In the +Start 
series, the Positive tasks are the first four, and in the +End series they are the 
final four. 
4. H1.4 A negative start is preferred to a negative end. This condition is the 
negative equivalent of the positive manipulation in H1.3. The two series are 
identical, except for the location of four Negative snapping tasks. In the -Start 
series, the Negative tasks are the first four, and in the -End series they are the 
final four. 
 
Hypotheses Experience Preferred (%)  Frust.-Satis. (median/mean) 








































2.0 < .04 
Table 1. Experiment 1 hypotheses: the hypothesised preferred (A, green) and rejected (B, red) series, and their 
task construction – for example, 10(CN)+4P indicates 10 Control and 10 Negative trials (in a random order), 
followed by 10 Positive trials. The ‘experience’ plot in the middle of the table shows the hypothesised subjective 
experience across time for the predicted preferred (green) and rejected (red) series. Preference choice data and 
responses on the Frustration-Satisfaction scale are shown on the right.  
The specific sequences and their associated hypotheses are summarised in Table 1. In the 
table, C, P, and N respectively indicate Control, Positive, and Negative tasks, with 
numerals indicating the number of each task to be completed. For example, the notation 
“10(CN)+4P” indicates 10 Control and 10 Negative tasks (in a random order), followed 
by 4 Positive tasks. The baseline experiences within hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 consisted of a 
mixture of control and negative (10(CN)) or control and positive (10(PC)) trials because 
in our pilot testing we felt that this mixture increased the salience of the key 
manipulation, which was the timing within the sequence of the four positive or four 
negative trials. For example, a positive trial is more noticeably positive when contrasted 
with a mixture or control and negative trials, as compared to its contrast with a series 
comprising only control trials. The „Experience‟ column in Table 1 shows characteristic 
plots of the subjective experience (positive/negative) for each of the hypothetically 

















4.1 Experimental Task 
All drag-and-drop trials involved selecting a 50×50 px black-filled square and dragging it 
onto a target object demarked by a 50×50 px unfilled square with a 1 px black outline. 
The target was 252 px away from the starting location. When selected, the black square 
turned blue, and when exactly aligned with the target it turned green.  
Control dragging tasks used a fine-grained 4×4 px grid (approximately 1.3×1.3 mm 
on our experimental apparatus) in order to ease the difficulty of placing the object 
precisely onto the target. Dragging an object on this fine-grained grid was not noticeable 
to participants as „snapping‟ – movement appeared to be smooth and continuous. The 
tasks in this condition had a theoretical Fitts‟ Law index of difficulty (ID) of 6 bits (Fitts, 
1954; MacKenzie, 1992). The top plot of Figure 3 illustrates typical task completion with 
Control dragging: the user rapidly reduces the distance to the target, may overshoot the 
target, and slowly aligns the object with the target.  
Positive snapping tasks used an 84×84 px grid (28×28 mm), with the target object 
always aligned to the grid. As the user dragged the object, it snapped between locations 
on the grid (the grid was never visible – i.e. the gridlines in Figures 1 and 2 were not 
shown to participants). The index of difficulty of Positive dragging tasks was 2 bits, 
theoretically permitting faster task completion than Control tasks (because the grid makes 
the target substantially larger in motor space). The middle plot of Figure 3 characterises 
task completion with Positive snapping: the distance to target reduces in discrete steps 
(point  in the figure), with the final step rapidly completing the task.  
Negative snapping tasks used a 224×224 px grid, with the target object always 
misaligned from the grid by 28 px – this meant that the closest that the user could drop 
the object was 28 px from the target. As the user moved the object, it snapped to the grid 
(point  in the bottom plot of Figure 3), but the misalignment required participants to 
drop the object and reacquire it with the control key pressed (point ), at which point the 
object could be dragged using the fine-grained grid of the Control condition (point ). 
Final object placement behaved identically to Control tasks. The total index of difficulty 
for the two pointing components of negative snapping (initial movement of the object to 
28 pixels from the target  and final placement using the fine-grained grid ) was 4 bits. 
However, this difficulty value does not reflect the total time needed for the Negative 
tasks, since time was also required to drop and reacquire the object (region ). 
4.2 Method and Procedure 
Participants were instructed that they would make several choices between two series of 
drag-and-drop tasks, choosing which they would prefer to repeat if asked to do so. They 
then completed a series of 18 practice tasks to gain familiarity with the Control, Positive 
and Negative snapping behaviours. These practice trials made clear to participants that in 
Negative conditions, the object could not be placed directly on the target, and all 
participants correctly adopted the strategy of moving the object near to the target, then 
















Participants then moved on to the four experimental conditions (Table 1). Conditions 
MC1.1 and MC1.2 were completed first, with the recency conditions H1.3-1.4 completed 
in a random order. For each of the conditions, the order of exposure to hypothetically 
preferred and non-preferred series was counterbalanced.  
Upon completing the first series in each condition, participants used a slider to rate 
how frustrating (extremely, -5) to satisfying (extremely, +5) they found that series. After 
completing the second series, they used the same slider to rate that series, and then 
responded to our primary question by choosing which of the two series (first or second) 
they would repeat if asked to do so. On selecting their preferred series, they continued to 
the next pair of series after a rest period of 10 seconds.  
 
Figure 3. Characteristic plots of distance to target by time for Control dragging (top), Positive snapping (middle) 
and Negative snapping (bottom).  
4.2.1 Apparatus 
The study ran on Intel Core i7 computers running Linux Mint 14, with a wired Logitech 
optical mouse and a 22″ monitor at 1680×1050 px. Experimental software was written in 
Python, and recorded all user actions and responses.  
4.2.2 Participants  
Forty-six undergraduate computer science students volunteered to participate (9 female; 
aged 17–46, mean 20.2), each receiving a $5 café voucher. 
4.2.3 Design 
The primary dependent variable was participants‟ preference choice, separately analysed 
















(manipulation checks MC1.1 and MC1.2, and recency-versus-primacy hypotheses H1.3 
and H1.4). Timing data for the conditions were also analysed using paired t-tests to 
confirm there was no significant difference in time between series in the recency 
conditions that may explain preference choices (details given below). 
4.3 Results 
Results are analysed separately for each of the four conditions. Overall proportions 
choosing each series in each condition are shown in Table 1.  
Manipulation Check 1.1: Positive vs. Control. As intended, a significant majority of 
participants (40 of 46 people, 87%, 95% CI [.74, .95]) chose the Positive snapping series 
rather than the Control series (binomial sign test, p < .001). Part of the preference for 
positive snapping may be attributable to its much faster performance (Positive mean time 
7.62 s, 95% CI [7.06, 8.18]) compared to Control (mean 17.15 s, 95% CI [16.27, 18.02]): 
t45 = 20.78, p < .001, d = 3.8. Similarly, participants‟ ratings of frustration-satisfaction for 
the Positive series (median 4.0) were significantly higher (indicating less frustration) than 
they were for Control (median 2.0): Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Z = 5.5, p < .001.  
We therefore accept MC1.1, and conclude that the Positive manipulation was 
effective in creating a positive experience (since Positive snapping trials were preferred 
to Control trials). 
Manipulation Check 1. 2: Control vs. Negative. Also as intended, a significant 
majority of participants (33 of 46 participants, 72%, 95% CI [.57, .84]) chose the Control 
series over the Negative series (binomial sign test, p = .004). Like MC1.1, part of this 
preference may be attributed to the Control series being much faster (mean time 17.08 s, 
95% CI [16.40, 17.75]) than the Negative series (mean 27.48 s, 95% CI [24.77, 30.19]): 
t45 = 7.80, p < .001, d = 1.6. Similarly, participants‟ ratings of frustration-satisfaction for 
the Negative series (median -1.0) were significantly lower (indicating greater frustration) 
than they were for Control (median 2.0): Wilcoxon Z = 4.9, p < .001.  
We therefore accept MC1.2, and conclude that the Negative manipulation was 
successful (since Control trials were preferred to Negative trials). 
Hypothesis 1.3: +End vs. +Start. Twenty-nine of the 46 participants (63%) chose the 
+End condition in preference to the +Start condition, but the difference was not 
significant (binomial sign test, p = .1). The two series, which were the inverse of one 
another in terms of task order, required similar completion times, as intended (a mean 
difference of 0.23, 95% CI [-1.47, 1.94], t45 = 0.28, p = .78, d = 0.03). Participants‟ 
ratings of frustration-satisfaction for +End (median 0) were similar to those for +Start 
(median 0), giving no significant difference (Wilcoxon Z = 1.2, p = 0.23).  
We therefore are unable to accept H1.3, as the hypothesised preference for the +End 
condition was not significant. A majority of participants conformed to the hypothesis 
















(69%). Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence that participants are more strongly 
influenced by the final moments of a sequence than they are by the initial moments.  
Hypothesis 1.4: -Start vs. -End. Twenty-nine of the 46 participants (63%) chose the -
Start condition in preference to the -End condition (binomial sign test, p = .1). As with 
hypothesis H1.3, the two series are order inverses of one another, so the times required 
for each condition were similar, as intended (mean difference 0.66 s, 95% CI [-0.70, 
2.02], t45 = 0.98, p = .33, d = 0.14). Participants‟ ratings of frustration-satisfaction for -
End (median 0.0) were significantly lower (i.e., more frustrating) than those for -Start 
(median 1.0): Wilcoxon Z = 2.0, p = .04.  
Therefore, while we cannot accept H1.4, there are indications that a different 
experiment might expose the effect. On the primary preference measure, a larger 
proportion of participants preferred the –Start sequence, but the proportion is again 
insufficient to show a statistically-significant difference. There was a significant 
difference in the frustration-satisfaction scale, but overall, we do not have clear evidence 
that participants are influenced more by final moments than by initial moments.  
4.4 Discussion 
The main objective of Experiment 1 was to test whether recency effects strongly 
influence preferences in interaction (i.e. they can outweigh primacy effects). Although 
the manipulation checks confirmed that we were correctly creating positive and negative 
experiences, the experimental conditions provided only weak evidence for the influence 
of recency effects. We next examine possible reasons for the overall lack of evidence, 
before addressing these limitations in the design of Experiment 2.  
4.4.1 Weak Momentary Stimuli 
The Positive and Negative tasks were designed to create momentary positive and negative 
experiences for the user. Although the manipulation check conditions showed the 
anticipated preferences for the Positive and Negative tasks in isolation, they were not as 
strongly preferred as anticipated. While 87% preferred the Positive condition to Control 
(MC1.1), only 72% preferred the Control condition to Negative (MC1.2).  
When considering that snapping allowed the Positive MC1.1 series to be completed 
in less than half the time of the Control series (7.6 s vs. 17.2 s), and with much less 
manipulation effort, it is surprising that 13% of participants preferred the Control 
condition.  
It is also surprising that 28% of participants selected the Negative MC1.2 series as 
preferred, especially when considering that it took 61% longer than the Control series to 
complete (27.5 s vs. 17.1 s). It also added a mechanical burden in having to drop and 
reacquire the object to override the misaligned grid. However, Negative trials were not 
without some element of assistance. In particular, the initial snapping behaviour allowed 
















could without it. It is possible that this rapid attainment of an „almost there‟ state was 
valued.  
In Experiment 2, the magnitude of the Negative momentary experiences is 
accentuated by altering the grid resolution to reduce any positive sensation associated 
with rapid target approach. This is achieved by using an initial starting state that was 
misaligned with a large grid size, causing the object to actually snap further from the 
target than when it is first selected.    
4.4.2 Unstable Baseline Experience 
The main experimental conditions H1.3 and H1.4 altered the ordering of four Positive or 
Negative tasks (4P and 4N in Table 1) with respect to a baseline of mixed trials. In H1.3, 
the baseline consisted of 10 Control and 10 Negative tasks; and in H1.4 it consisted of 10 
Positive and 10 Negative tasks. Although the intention of using a mixture of trial types 
within the baseline was to increase the salience of the key manipulation (the ordering of 
the four positive or negative trials), it is possible that the mixture caused the opposite 
effect. The three different types of snapping behaviour within one series of tasks may 
have created a pattern of experience that was more complex than intended, thereby 
reducing the salience of the intended manipulation.  
In Experiment 2, we modify the baseline experience in each series so that it consists 
only of Control trials, providing a more consistent reference point for assessment.  
4.4.3 Primacy Effects are Stronger than Anticipated 
In creating task series that were objectively identical in total content, we relocated the 
terminating end experience (4P or 4N) to the start of the other series. Based on previous 
work in psychology, our hypothesis was that recency effects would be stronger than 
primacy effects – but the conflict between these two effects may have reduced the 
differences in Study 1 to the point where they were no longer statistically significant. 
Experiment 2 adds conditions to isolate recency and primacy effects by comparing 
sequences that have the positive or negative stimulus located at the start, middle, and end 
of the series.  
5 Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2, like that of Experiment 1, was to provide evidence that 
sequencing effects influence user preferences of interactive series. Experiment 2 used a 
modified version of the method used in Experiment 1. It maintained the forced-choice 
preference selection between pairs of sequences (again using drag-and-drop tasks), as 
summarised in Table 2. Following Manipulation Check conditions MC2.1 and MC2.2, 
participants completed three paired task sequences that examined both positive and 
negative versions of the following comparisons: End vs. Start, Middle vs. End, and Start 
vs. Middle. For example, condition H2.3 examined preferences for a series with a 
















positive end (+End) with a positive middle (+Mid). Experiment 2 also increased the 
magnitude of the negative momentary experience and stabilised the baseline experience, 
as described above. 
Specific paired series conditions are summarised in Table 2. All participants first 
carried out the two Manipulation Check (MC) conditions that were similar to the MC 
conditions in Experiment 1: 
1. MC2.1 Positive snapping preferred to control dragging. This condition was 
included to validate the assumption that participants preferred Positive tasks to 
Control tasks. The two series contained 8 Positive tasks (8P) and 8 Control 
tasks (8C).  
2. MC2.2 Control dragging preferred to negative snapping. This condition was 
included to validate the assumption that participants prefer control dragging to 
negative snapping. 
The experiment tested three different Positive stimulus hypotheses:  
3. H2.3 A positive end is preferred to a positive start. The two series were 
identical in total content, but four Positive snapping tasks occurred at either 
the start or the end of the series. This hypothesis is similar to H1.3 in 
Experiment 1, and is intended to compare the effects of primacy versus 
recency (but with the altered methodology of Experiment 2). 
4. H2.4 A positive end is preferred to a positive middle (positive recency 
without opposing primacy). Four Positive tasks occurred either at the middle 
or the end of the series. In contrast to the series tested in H2.3, any primacy 
effect (accentuating the positive start) should be eliminated. This hypothesis 
therefore tests recency effects in the absence of potentially opposing primacy 
effects. 
5. H2.5 A positive start is preferred to a positive middle (positive primacy 
without opposing recency). Four Positive tasks occurred either at the start or 
the middle of the series. This hypothesis tests a primacy effect – whether a 
positive start is remembered more strongly than the positive middle.  
The experiment also tested three different Negative stimulus hypotheses:  
6. H2.6 A negative start is preferred to a negative end. Four Negative tasks 
occurred at either the start or end of the series. This hypothesis is similar to 
H1.4 in Experiment 1, and is intended to again compare the effects of primacy 
versus recency.  
7. H2.7 A Negative middle is preferred to a negative end (negative recency 
without opposing primacy). This hypothesis is the equivalent of H2.4, but 
















H2.6, any primacy effect (accentuating the Negative start) should be 
eliminated. The hypothesis tests recency effects in the absence of potentially 
opposing primacy effects. 
8. H2.8 A negative middle is preferred to a negative start (negative primacy 
without opposing recency). This hypothesis is the Negative equivalent of 
H2.5, testing possible primacy effects of a Negative start. If the Negative start 
is strongly remembered, then participants should prefer the Negative middle.  
 
9. Hypotheses Experience Preferred (%)  Frust.-Satis. (median/mean) 




















































































86.5 = 0.98 
Table 2. Experiment 2 hypotheses: the hypothesised preferred (A) and rejected (B) series, and their exact task 
makeup – for example, 12C+4P indicates 12 Control trials followed by 4 Positive trials. The ‘experience’ plot in 
the middle of the table shows the hypothesised subjective experience across time for the predicted preferred 
(green) and rejected (red) series (time axis not to scale). Preference choice data and responses on the 
Frustration-Satisfaction scale are shown on the right side of the table. 
We also analyse the influence that the order of exposure to the series had on 
participants‟ preferences. Although series order was counterbalanced across participants, 
it is possible that preferences may vary dependent on presentation order – for example, it 
is possible that the influence of a negative ending to a sequence may dissipate over time, 
resulting in a stronger aversion to negative ending when it is more recently encountered 
(i.e., when experienced as the second series, rather than the first).  
5.1 Experimental Task 
As in Experiment 1, all trials involved selecting and dragging a 50×50 px black-filled 
square precisely onto a target object demarked by a 50×50 px unfilled square with a one-
















object. Positive and Control tasks in Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 
1. Negative trials were modified such that the grid had a resolution of 1022 px, with the 
target placed in the centre of the grid. Consequently, when the user first moved the object 
in Negative tasks, it snapped to align with the grid at a location that was further from the 
target (see Figure 4), requiring users to immediately drop and reacquire the object. This 
modification was used to remove the positive element of more rapid target approach from 
Negative tasks, and thereby increase their subjective negativity.  
Baseline tasks within each series were also modified from Experiment 1. All series 
contained 12 Control tasks (rather than the mixture of 20 tasks used in Experiment 1), 
plus 4 Positive or 4 Negative trials. The experimental modification was made to create a 
simpler and more uniform baseline experience. 
 
Figure 4. In Negative trials in Experiment 2, the black square was initially placed at the centre of the snapping 
grid of resolution 1022 px. The target was initially 252 px away from the black square (left). When first selected, 
the black square snapped to align with the grid, moving it further away from the target (right). 
5.2 Method and Procedure  
As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed that they would make several choices 
between two series of drag-and-drop tasks, choosing which they would prefer to repeat. 
They then completed a series of 18 practice drag-and-drop tasks to gain familiarity with 
the Control, Positive and Negative snapping behaviours.  
Unlike Experiment 1, the positive (H2.1–H2.3) and negative (H2.3–H2.5) 
experimental conditions were divided as a between-subjects factor (i.e. each participant 
completed either the positive or negative conditions, but not both). This amendment to 
the within-subjects design of Experiment 1 was made to reduce the number of series 
encountered by each participant, and to avoid them becoming overwhelmed by the 
number of comparisons (16 series and 8 comparisons if exposed to all conditions) and 
therefore insensitive to the manipulation – a known confound in forced-choice 
experiments (Keren and Raaijmakers, 1988). 
Therefore, after the practice trials, participants moved on to five experimental 
conditions, beginning with manipulation check conditions MC2.1 and MC2.2. Each 
participant then completed three pair comparisons based on their assignment to the 
















were presented in random order; in addition, the ordering of the sequences within each 
pair was also counterbalanced.  
Participants‟ subjective experience was assessed after each series using the 11-point 
scale of Experiment 1 (extremely frustrating -5 to extremely satisfying +5). Following 
each pair of series, participants made a forced-choice response selecting the series they 
would prefer to repeat.  
The apparatus and participant pool was the same as Experiment 1. Seventy-three 
undergraduate computer science students volunteered to participate (12 female; aged 18-
44, mean 20.2). Preference choice, task completion time, and subjective frustration-
satisfaction measures were analysed as in Experiment 1.  
5.3 Results 
Results for the eight experimental conditions are separately analysed in the following 
sections. In summary, three of the four hypothesised recency effects were supported, but 
none of the four hypotheses about primacy effects were supported. Table 2 summarises 
preference choices and mean/median Likert scale results, together with statistical 
outcomes. Figure 5 graphically summarises overall preferences choices for each of the 
eight conditions. Order effects for preference choices are summarised in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2 preference choice results. Percentage of choices for the hypothesised preferred (green, 
bottom; first named series) and not-preferred alternatives for each of the eight hypotheses. 
 
5.3.1 Manipulation Check 2.1: Positive vs. Control 
As intended, a significant majority of participants chose the Positive series over the 
Control series: 59 of 73 people (81%), 95% CI [.70, .89], binomial test p < .001. They 
also rated the Positive series as more satisfying than the Control series (means 3.85 and 


































































s, 95% CI [6.4, 7.4], which was significantly shorter than the Control series at 14.2 s, 
95% CI [13.5, 14.9]: t72 = 24.1, p < .001, d = 2.9. 
Analysis of the effect of order (Figure 6) shows that a significantly larger proportion 
of participants selected the Positive series when it was completed second (90%) rather 
than first (68%) – two-sample test for equality of proportions, 2 = 4.57, p = .03. This 
suggests that a recency effect may apply, even in the manipulation check condition – 
participants were more likely to select the Positive series if it was experienced more 
recently.  
5.3.2 Manipulation Check 2.2: Control vs. Negative 
A significant majority of participants chose the Control series over the Negative series: 
69 of 73 people (94.5%), 95% CI [.87, .98], p < .001. Mean frustration/satisfaction 
ratings for the two series were substantially different at 2.23 for Control and -1.67 for 
Negative (Wilcoxon p < .001). Mean times with the Control and Negative series were 
14.3 s, 95% CI [13.6, 14.9], and 34.9 s, 95% CI [30.1, 39.7], and the difference was 
significant: t72 = 8.98, p < .001, d = 1.4. There was no effect of order (
2
 ≈ 0, p = 1).  
In comparison with Experiment 1, in which only 72% preferred the Control series to 
Negative, the experimental modification to increase the magnitude of sensation 
associated with Negative trials was successful. 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2 preference choice results by series order. Percentage of choices for the hypothesised 
preferred (green, bottom; right of the two series in each condition) and not-preferred series, dependent on which 
series was completed second, for each of the eight hypotheses. 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 2.3: Positive Recency vs. Positive Primacy 
A significant majority of participants chose the +End series (25 of 37, 68%, 95% CI [.50, 
.82]) in preference to the +Start series: binomial test, p = .047. We therefore accept H2.3. 















































































































































responses, with a higher mean for the +End series (1.51) than the +Start series (0.95): 
Wilcoxon p = .008). As intended, the mean time to complete the series was similar at 
24.67 s, 95% CI [23.2, 26.1], and 24.1 s, 95% CI [22.2, 25.9], for +End and +Start: t36 = 
0.84, p = 0.41, d = 0.11. 
As shown in Figure 6, participants were much more likely to select the +End series 
when completed second (94%) rather than first (42%), giving a significant effect of order 
(2 = 9.29, p = .002). This again conforms to a recency effect – a Positive ending has a 
stronger effect on subjective experience when more recently experienced.  
5.3.4 Hypothesis 2.4: Positive Recency without Opposing Primacy 
A significant majority of participants chose the +End series (30 of 37, 81%, 95% CI [.65, 
.92]) in preference to the +Mid series – binomial test, p < .001. We therefore accept 
H2.4. Frustration/satisfaction responses are again similar to preference selection, with 
means of 1.97 for +End and 1.24 for +Mid (Wilcoxon p = .01). 
As intended, the mean time to complete the series was similar at 23.9 s, 95% CI 
[22.7, 25.1], and 24.2 s, 95% CI [23.1, 25.2], for +End and +Mid: t36 = 0.47, p = 0.64, d 
= 0.07. 
There was no significant effect of order (2 = 0.85, p = 0.36), although the trend 
reflects that of conditions H2.1 and H2.3, with a larger proportion of participants 
preferring the positive ending when completed more recently (89.5%) rather than first 
(72%).  
5.3.5 Hypothesis 2.5: Positive Primacy without Opposing Recency 
The test of primacy showed no significant effects. Approximately half of the participants 
(51%) selected the +Start series. Mean responses on the frustration/satisfaction scale 
were similar at 1.32 for +Start and 1.13 for +Mid (Wilcoxon, p = .41). There was also no 
significant effect of order (2 = 0.32, p = 0.57). We therefore fail to accept H2.5. 
5.3.6 Hypothesis 2.6: Negative Recency vs. Negative Primacy 
Conforming to our hypothesis, a significant majority of participants chose the -Start 
series (26 of 35, 75%, 95% CI [.57, .88]) in preference to the -End series: binomial test, 
p = .006. We therefore accept H2.6.  
Responses on the frustration/satisfaction scale were similar to preference choices, 
with the mean response for –Start (0.23) substantially higher than that for –End (-1.06): 
Wilcoxon p = .008. The mean times to complete the series were very similar at 35.7 s, 
95% CI [33.3, 38.1], and 35.7 s, 95% CI [33.4, 38.0], for –Start and –End: t34 = 0.05, p = 
















There was no significant order effect (2 ≈ 0, p = 1), with a similar proportion of 
participants preferring the –Start series, regardless of whether it was completed first 
(75%) or second (74%).  
5.3.7 Hypothesis 2.7: Negative Recency without Opposing Primacy 
There was no significant overall preference for the –Mid series (21 of 35, 60%, 95% CI 
[0.42, 0.76]) over the –End series: binomial test, p = .31. We therefore fail to accept 
H2.7. Frustration/satisfaction responses again show significantly more frustration with 
the –End series (mean -0.63) than –Mid (-0.03): Wilcoxon p = .05.  
There was no significant order effect (Figure 6), with a similar proportion of 
participants preferring the –Start series, regardless of whether it was completed first 
(75%) or second (74%): 2 = 1.34, p = 0.24. 
Although there was no significant effect of order, the proportion of choices reflect the 
earlier observed significant effects, with 52% preferring –End to –Mid when –End was 
completed first, but only 28% preferring –End (and 72% selecting –Mid) when –End was 
completed second. As discussed later, these values conform to an explanation that recent 
negative experiences are more likely to be rejected.  
5.3.8 Hypothesis 2.8: Negative Primacy without Opposing Recency 
As with the Positive primacy hypothesis (H2.5), there were no significant effects of 
Negative primacy: although 63% of participants stated a preference for –Mid, the 
difference was not significant (binomial p = .18). Responses on the 
frustration/satisfaction scale also show no significant effect (Wilcoxon p = 0.98). We 
therefore fail to accept H2.8. There was no significant effect of order (2 = 0.86, p = 
0.35).  
6 General Discussion  
Together, the main findings of Experiments 1 and 2 are: 
1. Positive and negative recency effects can significantly influence user preferences 
for interactive series (Experiment 2).  
2. The experiments provided no evidence that primacy effects influence preferences 
for interactive series (Experiment 2).  
3. Recency effects were strongest when the positive or negative stimuli was 
recently encountered (experimentally), possibly suggesting that the preference 
effects may be transitory (Experiment 2). 
4. Experimentally observing recency effects on preference can be difficult due to 
















experience (Experiment 1), and possible transitory nature of the effects 
(Experiment 2).  
In this section, we consider issues that are relevant to the further study and use of 
sequencing effects in HCI, including a comparison of the results from the two 
experiments, the types of experiences that trigger the effects, possibilities for further 
investigation of primacy effects, and the potential for making use of sequencing effects in 
design. 
6.1 Why Were Recency Effects Stronger in Experiment 2 than 1? 
Experiments 1 and 2 both included hypotheses concerning preference for a positive end 
over a positive start (hypotheses H1.3 and H2.3) as well as preference for a negative start 
over a negative end (hypotheses H1.4 and H2.6). Neither hypothesis was supported in 
Experiment 1, but both were supported in Experiment 2.  
We believe two factors contributed to the difference in outcome between 
Experiments 1 and 2. First, Experiment 2 was more powerful than Experiment 1 because 
it involved many more participants (73 vs. 46). For example, H1.3 was not accepted 
(binomial test p = .1) with 63% of participants selecting a preference for +End over 
+Start. If exactly the same proportion of the 73 participants in Experiment 2 had selected 
+End, a binomial test would have accepted H2.3, with p = 0.03 – in fact, the response 
was stronger in Experiment 2, at 68%, yielding p = .002.  
These preference rates of 63 and 68% in Experiments 1 and 2 are not dissimilar to the 
68.5% preference rate observed in Kahneman‟s et al.‟s (1993) cold-pressor experiment. 
This suggests that future HCI researchers should carefully consider the number of 
participants required to reveal significant effects on preference.  
Second, we intentionally increased the magnitude of negative stimulus in Experiment 
2 to ensure that negative trials were perceived negatively. In the manipulation check 
condition of Experiment 1 (MC1.2), 28% of participants selected the Negative series as 
preferred to the Control series. By increasing the magnitude of performance impairment 
encountered during negative trials, in the manipulation check condition of Experiment 2 
(MC2.2), only 5% of participants selected the Negative series in preference to the Control 
series. We suspect that the increased intensity of negative sensations during negative 
trials increased the sensitivity of Experiment 2, allowing it to confirm a preference for 
+Start over +End (H2.6, 74%, p = .006) when Experiment 1 failed to do so (H1.4, 63%, 
p = .1).  
6.2 Stimuli for Sequencing Effects 
There are many questions for further research concerning the types, magnitudes, and 
durations of interactive stimuli that contribute to sequencing effects. Previous studies of 
sequencing effects outside of HCI have examined strong hedonic stimuli such as pain 
(Ariely, 1998; Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1993). However, 
















physical effort, or the annoyance and frustration associated with successful and failed 
assistance, such as that examined in our experiments.  
Understanding the subjective outcomes of successful and failed attempts at assistance 
is important because interfaces are increasingly seeking to explicitly offer suggestions, 
adapt their behaviour, or modify the user‟s input to match the system‟s inference of the 
user‟s goal. Previous studies have shown asymmetries between objective performance 
and subjective experience of assistive user interfaces (Quinn and Cockburn, 2016; Quinn 
and Zhai, 2016), but not the influence of sequencing their successes and failures, as 
examined here. 
Beyond the positive and negative experiences derived from assistive interfaces, it is 
likely that other forms of momentary stimuli will also induce reliable sequencing effects. 
Table 3 summarises prior studies in HCI relating to sequencing effects, identifying the 
primary momentary stimulus examined. The table shows that recency effects have 
generally been confirmed across a variety of stimuli, including mental effort (Hassenzahl 
and Sandweg, 2004), visible progress (Harrison et al., 2007), physical effort (Cockburn et 
al., 2015), game difficulty/challenge (Gutwin et al., 2016), and the satisfaction/frustration 
of user interface assistance and assistance failures (this paper). Fully separating the 
experiential influence of the stimuli in these experiments is difficult – for example, a 
manipulation of mental effort may also induce frustration and annoyance – however, the 
indications across studies are that recency effects occur across a wide range of different 
types of interactions.  
The stimuli examined across the studies shown in Table 3 can be viewed as 
conforming to different points on the NASA TLX categorisation of workload measures 
(Hart and Staveland, 1988), which includes dimensions for mental, physical and temporal 
demand, as well as measures for performance, frustration and overall effort. Future 
studies might examine sequencing effects with other forms of affective stimuli during 
interaction, such as different points on the valence/arousal classification schema (Russell, 
1980). Understanding the influence of broad types of momentary stimuli could be 
relevant to the increasingly wide range of user interface applications, such as interfaces 
for behaviour change and health/mood monitoring (Gurman et al., 2012; Maher et al., 
2014). For example, if recency effects are validated in these domains, then a short 
positive experience at the end of a session with a behaviour change application may have 
a disproportionately strong influence on the likelihood that users later return to the 
application.  
Another area for further research related momentary experiences concerns the 
development, validation and deployment of new methods for determining the user‟s 
affective state. In particular, biometric data captured through sensors such as galvanic 
skin response and functional magnetic resonance imaging can provide indications of the 
user‟s momentary state (Cowley et al., 2016; Fairclough, 2009; Kim et al., 2016), and 
these methods might be adapted to study and potentially influence sequencing effects 
during interaction – for example, interfaces might adapt to the user‟s affective state, 
potentially curtailing or extending an interactive session until a particular threshold 
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Table 3. Summary of prior studies examining sequencing effects, including the primary stimuli used to induce 
momentary experiences, the measure of experiential outcome, and a summary of the results.  
6.3 Absence of Primacy  
Primacy effects have been previously observed in interactive contexts – for example, Lee 
et al. (2011) attributed a choice preference for the first of two synthesised voices to 
primacy, and Harrison (2007) reported a general preference for the first of two progress 
bars (in their experimental order), but without reference to primacy.  
In our second experiment, neither of the conditions testing primacy (H2.5 and H2.8) 
showed evidence in support of their associated hypotheses. Indeed, H2.8 indicated the 
opposite effect: a majority of participants preferred the –Start series to the –Mid series. 
We suspect this may be due to the short duration of the series used in the experiment, 
causing experiences in the middle and the end of the series to become indistinct. In 
particular, the relatively strong preference (71%) for –Start condition when the –Mid 
series was completed second (Figure 6) is consistent with a recency effect: participants 
may have been averse to the relatively recent experience of the negative trials in the 
middle of the recently completed –Mid series. 
One promising avenue for further work on primacy effects in interaction concerns 
user recollection for different types of information in an interactive experience. 
Zauberman et al. (2006) showed that recency effects were particularly strong when 
participants made hedonic assessments of an experience (i.e. overall affective 
judgments), but that primacy effects were strong when participants were asked to make 
















dynamic display representing job applicants‟ correct and incorrect test responses, 
participants‟ overall satisfaction with the job applicant (a hedonic measure) was subject 
to recency effects, while their assessment of the number of correct responses was most 
strongly influenced by primacy effects.  
Our experiments were predominantly concerned with hedonic assessment 
(comparative satisfaction with the two series), which according to Zauberman‟s finding 
should be most strongly influenced by recency effects. There are therefore opportunities 
for exploring the influence that different question phrasing has on participants‟ 
recollection of interactive experience. Outcomes from such studies have potentially 
important applications in interaction – for example, users‟ decisions might be different if 
prompted with the text “if you are not satisfied with auto-correct, you can turn it off” 
(hedonic, emphasising recency) versus “if auto-correct makes frequent errors, you can 
turn it off” (informational, emphasising primacy). 
6.4 Transience and Endurance of Recency Effects 
Experiment 2 (summarised in Figure 6) showed that recency effects were strongest when 
the positive or negative ending was experienced most recently. For example, in 
conditions H2.3 and H2.4, the +End condition was preferred in 94% and 89% of choices 
when it was completed second, compared to only 42% and 72% when completed first. 
Similarly, in condition 2.7, the –End condition was rejected in 72% of choices when it 
was completed second, but only 47% when completed first.  
These findings are consistent with those observed in previous work, with 
Montgomery et al. (2009) reporting that global evaluations immediately following an 
experience give “conditions under which recency effect is most likely to be obtained”.  
Montgomery et al. postulated that primacy effects are more enduring than recency 
effects, and they experimentally investigated the prediction by testing recollection of 
experiences immediately afterwards and after a delay. Results showed an interaction 
effect of primacy/recency recall with delay – recollection of items at the beginning of a 
series degraded less over time compared to items later in the series.  
There are opportunities for further work in examining various temporal aspects 
related to interactive series and preferences. These include examining series of much 
longer duration than those tested in our experiment, as well examining recollection of 
those experiences after a delay. For example, we would like to compare users‟ 
recollection of simulated online shopping experiences that are manipulated to contain 
positive and negative effects of primacy and recency, and examine how immediately-
reported preferences change (if at all) over days and weeks. 
6.5 Sequencing Effects as a Design Risk and a Design Opportunity 
A user‟s subjective experience of an interactive task is likely to play an important role in 
their willingness to repeat the experience, and so understanding mechanisms that have a 
reliable impact on preferences is valuable for designers. Sign-up and checkout processes 
















memory of these sequences more pleasant has a clear benefit for site designers. Our 
experiments demonstrate that simple interface manipulations can contribute to reliable 
preference outcomes, suggesting that designers should be cautious to not inadvertently 
cause a negative effect. That is, even if designers are not interested in attempting to create 
a more positive experience, they must be careful to not accidentally cause a more 
negative one (e.g. by putting an additional demand or extra step at the end of a checkout 
sequence). The potential damage to user experience is accentuated because it is often the 
final stages of a sequence where a failure occurs (e.g. several pages of information input 
are only checked at the end of the sequence).  
The results reported in this paper, and those of related work on sequencing effects, are 
relevant for many forms of interaction design. When the interaction involves a series of 
actions, and there is likely to be momentary differences in the user‟s subjective 
experience of those actions, designers should carefully consider the possibility for 
recency effects to influence the user‟s overall remembered experience. Designers are 
often relatively unconstrained regarding the distribution of elements across an overall 
interaction – certain data must be collected, but the order of collection may be malleable. 
Our results suggest that designers should think carefully about recency effects when 
considering the distribution of interactive elements. Doing so may improve users‟ 
subjective experience and increase their willingness to use the system again in the future; 
conversely, failing to consider peak-end effects may cause adverse user reactions.  
7 Conclusion 
Sequencing effects such as primacy, recency, and the peak-end rule are known to 
influence people‟s recollection of experiences. Given their prevalence in the basic 
teachings of psychology, there has been relatively little research into sequencing effects 
in HCI. 
We reviewed prior research on sequencing effects and presented new experimental 
results exploring these phenomena and demonstrating that recency effects can 
significantly influence user‟s preference for interfaces that are otherwise identical in their 
objective interaction requirements. Together, the extensive findings from psychology, 
limited prior findings in HCI, and the results reported in this paper show that recency 
effects offer designers an opportunity to improve users‟ memories of their subjective 
experience. Conversely, failing to attend to the timing of negative interaction elements 
may cause much stronger adverse memories than anticipated. We advocate a better 
understanding of sequence effects as both an opportunity and a risk for interaction design 
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